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OUTER SPACE RESOURCES IN EFFICIENT
AND EQUITABLE USE: NEW FRONTIERS
FOR OLD PRINCIPLES*
CLAS G. WIHLBORG
New York University and
Institute for International
Economic Studies, Stockholm

and

PER MAGNUS WIJKMAN
Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution
and Institute for International
Economic Studies, Stockholm

SPACE is the common property of mankind. Traditionally,access to
common propertyresources such as the oceans has been open and free.
This is appropriatefor resources that are plentiful. At first glance, space
appearsto be not only abundantbut infinite.However, futuredemandfor
space resources may soon make them scarce in the sense that an allocation mechanism will be needed for their efficient utilization. Satellites
alreadyperformtraditionaland new services using outer space resources,
and plans for industrialventures in space are underway. Space activities
compete with more earthlyactivities for use of the scarce electromagnetic
spectrum.
This paperdemonstrateshow the generalprinciplesof efficientmarkets
easily can be extended to space resources. In fact, the marketmechanism
is particularlywell suited to achieving efficient use of these resources
given the difficultyfor a central authorityto obtain the necessary information. The paper is inspiredby two seminalarticles by R. H. Coase on
the organizationof economic activity.' Our applicationis one of many
* The authorsthankWilliamBaumol,Peter
Bohm, and Mats Bohmanfor valuablecomments. This is a revised and expandedversion of a paper presentedat the Conferenceon
Space Commerce:New Optionsfor EconomicGrowth,November 1978,Sponsoredby the
SalomonBrothersCenterfor the Studyof FinancialInstitutionsandthe GraduateCenterfor
Applied Science, New York University, and organized by the American Institute of
Aeronauticsand Astronautics.The second authoracknowledgesfinancialsupportfromthe
Pew MemorialTrustand the Departmentof Commerce,NOAA, Officeof Sea Grant,Grant
04-8-M01-149.
1 R. H. Coase, The Federal CommunicationsCommission,2 J. Law & Econ. 1 (1959)
[hereinaftercited as Coase, FTC];andid., The Problemof Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. 1
(1960).Togetherwith WilliamMecklingandJoraMinasian,Coase wrote Problemsin Radio
FrequencyAllocation(RandCorp. 1963).Althoughthis manuscriptremainedunpublished,
the coauthorslater publishedtwo importantcontributions.See WilliamH. Meckling,Management of the Frequency Spectrum, 1968 Wash. U.L.Q. 26; and Jora R. Minasian,
PropertyRightsin Radiation:An AlternativeApproachto RadioFrequencyAllocation,18J.
Law & Econ. 221 (1975).
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possibilities; the same reasoning could be applied to other common
propertyresources.
Section I defines the "orbit spectrumresource" commonlyreferredto
in discussions of the allocationof space resourcesand arguesthatit in fact
consists of two separableresources which shouldbe allocatedseparately:
the physical orbit "slots" and the electromagneticspectrum.The section
also emphasizesthat differenttechniquesfor utilizingspace can substitute
for each other and that space resources and earthresources are substitutable.
Section II argues that establishing marketable, divisible, indefinite user

rights for the totality of space resources and well-defined enforceable
liability rules for interferenceshould be sufficientfor efficiency in most
uses of space resources. This conclusion is valid in spite of the frequent
occurrence of external effects.
Section III considers the contributionthat an internationalauthority
can make to the efficient use and equitable distributionof space resources. Efficiency aspects generally can be separated from equity aspects when conditions for efficient markets are fulfilled. The section
therefore argues that once certain conventions definingmarketbehavior
have been adoptedthe primetask of an internationalauthorityis to distribute rents from space resources. Section III compares the current firstcome, first-servedregime with a squatters'-rightsregime, an auction regime, and a currentproposal to carve up space resources and distribute
the parts among nations. The current regime is often equated with a
squatters'-rightsregime, but we argue that it differs fundamentallybecause the propertyrights that accompanythe user rights are too incomplete for efficient markets to exist. The current regime also bureaucraticallyconstrainsthe use of some space resources.
I.

Is SPACE SCARCE?

The increasingusefulness of outer space is the basis for its currentor
potential scarcity. This section describes briefly some of the services
provided and the ways in which space is utilized.
Satellites can serve as unmannedrelay stations (for example, Comsat
and Landsat)as well as mannedindustrialestates (for example, the late
Skylab).2 We consider mainly the formeruse but our analysis is valid for
2
Relay stations provide communication services and remote sensing services. Communication satellites are used for radio, television, telephone, and telex services. Remote sensing
satellites collect a wide range of information about our planet such as meteorological data,
ocean and coastal zone data, environmental data, and earth resource data. Both types of
satellites are in growing demand for commercial use and as public goods. Space platforms
have not yet been put to commercial use. They appear to be commercially feasible for
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both kinds, because each requiresboth a location in space and a means of
communication with earth.

Wireless communicationson earth can cover only a limitedgeographic
area due to the curvatureof the earthaway from the line of sightfollowed
by most frequencies.3For longer distances, relay stations mustbe built or
shortwave signals of unreliablequality used. Consequently, cable transmission of signalsis often more economicalthanwireless for long distance
communications,especially for transmittingover large bodies of water.
Satellites now provide yet anotheralternative.They receive straight-line
signalsfrom earth and redirectthem back to anotherpoint on earthwith a
degree of precision that is determinedby their on-boardhardware.Satellites can provide many services at lower cost than can earth-basedrelay
stations, cables, or shortwave frequencies.
Currenttechnology allows signals to be sent directly from a specific
transmitterto an individualreceiver (for instance, telephone, telex, or
computerterminal)providedthat both are equippedwith the appropriate
hardware. Large civilian and military organizations have found such
point-to-point(or fixed) services to be especially useful.4However, if the
marketis sufficientlylarge in a given area, use of collective ratherthan
individualreceiving equipmentreduces receptioncosts due to economies
of scale. Earthstationsreceive signalsfrom satellites and retransmitthem
to television, radio, or telephone sets via cables or wires. Broadcasting
and fixed services make different demands on the electromagnetic
spectrumand on equipmenton earth and in space.
Satellites may be geostationary,that is, remainin a fixed position relative to earth, or they may circle the earthin polarorbitsor in other orbits.
Geostationaryorbits are especially valuable for those services that require twenty-four-hourcoverage of a given point on earth. Navigational
aids, some kinds of computer-datatransmission,and solar-energystations
are examples of services for which geostationarysatellites are vital. It is
possible, however, to replace one geostationarysatellite by two or more
certainactivities, for instance as solar energy stations, and for energy intensive activities
(aluminumproduction)and engineeringunder gravity-freeconditions (ball-bearingconstructionand crystalgrowth).Some of these uses were firstsuggestedby GerardK. O'Neill
in his pioneeringwork, The High Frontier:Human Colonies in Space (1976). See also
DelbertD. Smith, Space Stations:InternationalLaw and Policy (1979).
3 For instance, FM radio signalsfollow line of sight, while shortwavesignalsbounce off
the ionosphereand back to earthat unpredictabletimes and places.
4 Traditionalbroadcastingservices such as radioand television can be sent also as fixed
services. Proposalsfor a system of threetelevision satellitesto linkthe five Nordiccountries
in a common television area are currentlybeing consideredby the Nordic governments.
Viewers in Iceland, for example, could pick up Danish or Swedish programsdirectly by
addingsupplementalreceivingequipmentto theirsets. Some commercialtelevision stations
in the United States currentlyemploy satellite-cum-cabletransmission.
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nonstationary satellites. Such a substitution increases the equipment
costs but may reduce other costs.5
The equipmenton satellites in space may be such that signals are directly reflected by the satellite to earth (real time) or the satellite may
store informationon board for delayed (rapid)transmission.Alternative
techniquesand orbits are thereforeavailableto providea specific service.
For example,the user of a nonstationarysatellitemightconstructa number
of expensive earth stations under its orbit, or he may invest in on-board
equipmentthat stores informationfor rapidtransmissionwhen the satellite passes over a single earth station. The user weighs the inconvenience
of delayed transmissionand the cost of equippingandlaunchinga satellite
with the necessary storagefacilities againstthe cost of buildinga sufficient
numberof earth stations for real-timetransmission.
Two factors constrain the capacity of these orbits and cause space
resources to be scarce. First, there is a definitephysical limit to the use of
geostationaryorbits. Slots are located in a "tube" with a total length of
about 150,000 miles. Satellites are never absolutely stationary. If each
satellite "wanders" at most 100 miles horizontally,"the geostationary
orbit could provide 1,500 orbital slots along its length, each with a zero
probabilityof collision. Since only 200 satellites are expected to be in the
geostationaryorbit by the end of 1981, congestion does not now appear
imminent.' However, available slots are not perfect substitutesfor each
other. Telecommunicationsare highly concentratedto flows between a
few regionson earthand satellites for communicationsbetween two given
points on earthhave a preferredlocation.8Thus, the demandfor satellite
5 Orbitingsatellites are affected by centrifugalforce (determinedby their speed) and by
gravitationalforce (determinedmainly by their distance from earth). When these forces
offset each other, a satellitecan remainin orbitwith its enginesturnedoff. A satellitethatis
injectedinto orbit at the speed with which the earthrotates aroundits axis stays constant
relativeto earthif it is on a planethroughthe equator.It can turnoff its enginesand remain
in orbit if it is 22,240 miles from earth. If it is placed in a lower (higher)orbit, it must be
injected at a higher (lower) speed than the earth's rotationin order to offset its greater
(lesser)gravitationalpull, andconsequentlyit will not be geostationary.The speed at which
a satellite is injectedinto orbit is determinedby the power generatedwhen it is launched.
The greaterthe power, the greaterthe launchingcosts. Thus, differentorbitsinvolve different costs, but they also have differentcharacteristicsmakingthem appropriatefor different
services.
6
See U.N. Committeeon the PeacefulUses of OuterSpace, PhysicalNatureandTechnical Attributesof the GeostationaryOrbit, U.N. Doc. A/AC 105/203,para. 18 (29 August
1977).
7 New satellites are currentlybeing launched at the rate of 20 per year, and 200 are
expected to be in the geostationarytube at the end of 1981. See U.N. Committeeon the
PeacefulUses of OuterSpace, supra note 6.
8
The demandfor telecommunicationshas a high elasticity with respect to per capita
income. At given levels of per capita income the numberof messages exchangedbetween
two regions increases exponentiallywith the size of their populations.The demandfor
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slots in the near future will probably be concentratedon the arc of the
geostationaryorbit over the North Atlantic. This suggeststhat congestion
may occur in the foreseeable future, especially since the numberof possible uses of satellites can be expected to increase as well as the numberof
users

.9

Satellites in polar orbits, passing over the poles while the earth rotates
aroundits axis, observe a given point on earth at fixed intervals. Both the
frequencywith which an areais observed andthe size of this areadepends
on the satellite's distancefrom earth. Morefrequentobservationrequires
smaller orbits and therefore covers smaller areas. Satellites in smaller
orbits require greater injection speeds, which entail higher launching
costs. Some polar orbits are especially well suited to maritimesatellites,
others to earthresource satellites, and so on. One mightassumethat polar
orbits are more plentiful since they are not confined to a single distance
from earth as are geostationary orbits. However, just as geostationary
orbital slots differ, so do polar orbits. Each has differentpropertiesand
any combinationof particularpropertiesis potentially scarce because it
generatesdifferenteconomic benefitsand costs when performingdifferent
services. To repeat this importantpoint, since differentorbits or slots are
not perfect substitutesfor most uses, they are potentially scarce.
The second constraint on orbit capacity is imposed by the electromagneticspectrum. Satellites transmittingwithin a certain area compete for use of the spectrum. They compete with each other and with
terrestrial communications and even with intergalactic transmissions.
Thus, the constraint on the use of orbits given by the use of the electromagneticspectrumis a constraintcommonto all uses of this resource.
The spectrumresource is already so congested on earth that the international community faces major problems of allocating frequencies. The
development of satellite technology leads to yet another claim.1'So far,
telecommunicationsconsequentlywill be greatestin denselypopulatedregionswithhighper
capita income.
Just as the strengthof rays fromthe sun dependson the anglewith which the rays hit the
earth, the qualityof radiotransmissionbetween a satelliteand a point on earthdependson
the angle with which the frequencywaves hit the earth. Less energy is needed to transmit
between relatively close points, and the degree of precision requiredin transmissionincreases with the angle. Togetherthese considerationsimplythata satelliterelayingbetween
two given points has a preferredposition in the orbit-preferred because it is more economicalthan other positions.
9 Assumingthat 150satellitesare alreadyabove the North Atlanticandthat 15 more will
be parkedthere each year, the available375 slots will be filled 15 years after 1981.Inactive
satellites can be removedfrom the geostationaryorbit.
10 Congestionor overuse of the electromagneticspectrumappearsas interference-the
jammingof one transmitterby anotheror the spilloverof one transmissioninto others. It is
obvious that if two sendersuse the same frequencywith the same strengthat the same time
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the problemhas been "solved" by assigningcertainbands (4, 12, and 16
GHz) for satellite communication.This has created the so-called orbitspectrumresource. This limitationon frequency use constrainsthe number of satellite slots in geostationary orbit since it determines the
minimumphysical distancebetween satellites necessary to avoid interference andjammingof communicationsin the assigned frequencies. Thus,
under the current regulatorysystem the scarcity of space resources is
made by man ratherthan by nature.The orbit-spectrumresource(that is,
the numberof slots) can be expandedby increasingthe numberof bands
available for satellite communications.Of course, this occurs at the expense of other potential uses of those bands.
This elementary review of satellite technology allows the following
conclusions:
1. The orbit-spectrumresourceis not a single resourcein fixed supplybut
a composite resource made up of the electromagneticspectrum and
satellite orbits. Each of these in turn consists of several dimensions.
2. The electromagneticspectrumis already congested, and parts of the
geostationaryorbit will be congested in the next decade.
3. More intensive exploitation of the resources can be achieved by applying more capital and labor to the naturalresources and by a more
efficientcombinationof the variouscomponentsof that resource:band
width, place, time, and strength.
4. Satellite services can be replaced by services which use earth resources alone.
Thus, we face a wide rangeof substitutionpossibilitiesfor both inputsand
outputs which, if properly exploited, can increase the supply of the resource and divert demandfor it to alternatives.The importantquestions
then are what we mean by efficient use of space and what mechanism
achieves efficiency given these substitutionpossibilities.
II.

PROPERTIES OF EFFICIENT

MARKETS FOR SPACE RESOURCES

This section argues that marketsallocate rights to use orbit-spectrum
resources more efficiently than do the nonmarketmechanismscurrently
in use." It considers three aspects of efficiency. First, efficiency means
and at the same place, neither will be clearly heard. But it is not so obvious what the solution
to the problem of interference is since the resource is not easily divisible and external effects
are therefore inherent in its use. It is interesting to note that it was his prior study of federal
regulation of the airwaves that inspired Coase's classic article on the treatment of external
effects, Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1.
11 We cannot prove that a market system is most efficient under all circumstances. We
simply point to its advantages relative to the centralized bureaucratic system for allocating
current user rights.
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that a resourceis allocated so that the marginalunit cannotbe reallocated
to anotheruser withoutloweringvalue added. Second, an efficientsystem
moves towards a new efficient allocation in the above sense after any
disturbancesuch as an increase in demandor a reductionof production
costs. These two aspects of efficiency will be denoted as partial efficiency
in the marketsfor space resources. Third, and more general, an efficient
system provides incentives for investment or research in new activities
when they are expected to produce higher value added than do current
activities.12

As an economic resource, space consists of orbital positions and frequency bands. Efficiency requires that these can be combined freely.
Currentlythey are sold as a unit with fixed coefficients. This is like assigninga radio station on earth a specific piece of real estate for a transmitter together with a frequency. Separate markets in frequency bands
and orbit positions make it possible for all users of space locations and
frequencies to trade the two separable economic resources until a
Pareto-optimalsituationis reached. In such a situationno user can change
location and frequency without paying more than the potential gains
generatedby the new combination.Note, however, that in orderfor the
markets for the resources to function efficiently, it must be possible to
purchasea unit of one of the resources conditionalon obtaininga certain
unit of the other resource. Not only are the resources in general complementarybut specific units of the two resources may be complementary.
To achieve static and dynamic efficiency a market system must be
characterizedby competitionin all relevantmarketsand by the equalityof
private and social costs and benefits. Furthermore,to be preferred, a
marketsystem must achieve a given level of efficiency at lower systems
costs.13
To fulfillthese conditionsthe marketsfor space resources should have
the followingproperties:(A) complete allocationregime,(B) divisibleand
marketableuser rights, (C) long contractperiods, (D) well-definedliability
rules. In the followingdiscussion of these propertiesit is assumedfor each
that conditionsfor efficient marketsare fulfilledin all respects other than
the issue at hand. In Section III we discuss whetherthese propertiesof a
12 The last aspect of efficiency can also be expressed in terms of static efficiency in the
allocation of research and development resources and capital.
13 This point was emphasized by Coase: "...
the problem is one of choosing the appropriate social arrangement for dealing with harmful effects. All solutions have costs and there
is no reason to suppose that government regulation is called for simply because the problem
is not well handled by the market or the firm." Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1, at 18. An
application of this to the case at hand can be found in A. S. DeVany et al., A Property System
for Market Allocation of the Electromagnetic Spectrum: A Legal Economic-Engineering
Study, 21 Stan. L. Rev. 1499 (1969).
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market system may develop without direction or interference by any authorities. This section assumes that the properties of efficient markets
must be deliberately created.
A.

Complete Allocation Regime

An allocation regime can be efficient only if it includes all resources that
substitute for, or complement, each other. Thus, marketable user rights to
resources in space must be defined to encompass substitutable modes of
producing particular goods and services. For instance, long-distance
communications can be transmitted by submarine cable, wire, and wireless as well as by satellite. Since real estate on earth is a well-priced and
marketed resource, efficiency requires that scarce orbital positions, too,
be priced in competitive markets. This allows a firm to compare the true
costs of alternative locations for a relay station. If orbital slots remain free
though scarce, too many resources will be invested in the building and
launching of satellites.
The allocation of user rights to the electromagnetic spectrum provides
another and perhaps a more important example of this principle. The
spectrum currently is subject to a dual regime: part is reserved for terrestrial use, part for spatial use. In addition, certain frequency bands are
reserved for specific uses. The close substitutability between different
parts of the spectrum necessitates that marketable user rights be defined
for the entire spectrum-along the ground as well as in space-for the
market system to be efficient. Coase's reasoning for the definition of
marketable user rights by the Federal Communications Commission for
frequency use along the ground applies as well to frequency use on the
ground and in space.14
Divisible and Marketable User Rights

B.

The trade-offs facing users of the electromagnetic spectrum are more
complicated than a simple choice between ground and space frequencies.
Many trade-offs exist with respect to strength of signal, size of antennae,
weight of satellites, precision in direction of the signal, and precision in
the use of frequencies. Trade-offs occur between different geostationary
orbits and other orbits and between the choice of orbit and all of the above
aspects of frequency use. The length of time a frequency is used can also
be traded off against location aspects and the different aspects of frequency use. The number of combinations among all these variables is
immense.
These considerations suggest that the efficient functioning of the market
14

Coase, FTC, supra note 1.
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mechanism requires the right to divide a purchased user right and to resell
the whole or a part of it. This requirement is fulfilled for most economic
resources but not for space resources. The right to divide and resell parts
of the user rights is especially important for achieving efficiency after
there has been a change in demand or technology. As the scarcity of the
spectrum increases with new uses, divisible user rights would make it
possible for the holder of a part of the spectrum to invest in more accurate
equipment and to sell off the frequencies that he no longer needs. This
would occur if the expected value of the new use exceeds the costs of
equipment allowing more precise frequency use.
The same argument can be applied to the area over which a specific
frequency spectrum is used. Geographically divisible user rights would
allow a holder to sell his right to the frequency in an area if potential new
users pay more than the costs of improving the directional qualities of his
equipment. Similarly, the wandering of a satellite in geostationary orbit
can be reduced by better on-board stabilization equipment (improved
station keeping). This allows a larger number of satellites within a limited
area without increasing the risk of collision.
C. Long Contract Periods
User rights may be purchased for either a limited or an indefinite period
of time. While both formally are cases of leasing, a lease for an indefinite
period of time in effect conveys a title of ownership to the lessee. How
does the length of the contract period affect the efficiency of the market
system? We show here that efficiency always prevails with indefinite user
rights, while inefficiencies can be caused by time-limited user rights if the
duration of the lease is shorter than the economic life span of the satellites. More specifically, it is the time-limit combined with costs for transforming the satellite to use by other firms and costs for transferring the
satellite to other orbit-slots and/or frequencies that cause inefficiency.
For instance, assume that a firm holds the user right to a frequencylocation combination for which another firm develops a more profitable
use. The latter firm is therefore willing to pay a higher price for the user
right than the current holder. If the new firm can use the current satellite
more profitably, it could simply purchase the satellite and put it into the
more efficient use. If, however, satellites are firm-specific, we must distinguish between the case in which the incumbent's equipment is designed
for a specific frequency-location combination (factor-specific equipment)
and that in which it can be used elsewhere without additional cost
(nonfactor-specific equipment).15
15 This distinction may be important at this early stage of space activities. Once launched,
satellites cannot easily be moved or changed. Even with space shuttles in use or with more
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The case involving nonfactor-specificequipment is the easiest. Efficiency prevails if user rights are defined over limited periods as well as
over indefinite periods. A new firm can obtain the frequency and the
location simply by paying more for the lease than the currentholder is
able to extract as rents from a time-limiteduser right. In the case of
indefiniteuser rights, the new user is willingto pay a higherprice than the
present value of the holder's rents over time with the inferiorequipment
or management. By assumption the incumbent can move without any
extra costs to anotherfrequency-locationcombinationwhere its rents on
the resources exceed the holder's. Efficiency in the markets for space
resources would be restored after a technological change. Efficiency in
the third and more general sense also prevails because incentives to develop and invest in new equipmentare not hamperedby the risk of having
to move and change frequency as long as this can be done without any
costs.
Partial efficiency in the markets for space resources also prevails in
cases involvingfactor-specific equipment with time-limitedas well as
indefiniteuser rights. Efficiency with respect to investmentand research
incentives presumes indefinite rights, however. To show this, consider
how efficiency is achieved in the two cases after a technologicalchange.
For an indefiniteuser rightthe new firmmust now bid a price that covers
the present value of the incumbent's expected rent on the orbit slot and
the frequencyplus compensationto him for capitalloss on the equipment.
This is efficient because capital destructionshould not occur unless new
capital is so much more productive that the increase in value added
covers the expected remainingvalue added on the old equipment. An
identical situation will result with time-limited user rights. It is not
sufficientfor the new firmsimplyto bid morefor the lease thanthe current
holder pays, because the incumbentwill be willinigto increase his bid up
to the point when he can no longer cover variablecosts. The old factorspecific equipmentthereforewill not be taken out of service until it produces a negativevalue added at the bid-upprice on the user rights.In this
situation, the increase in value added on the new equipmentcovers the
value added that will no longer be produced with the equipmentthat is
taken out of service.
The above discussion shows that the difference between time-limited
and indefiniteuser rights in the case of factor-specificequipmentis that
unanticipated capital gains or losses are distributed differently. With
indefiniteuser rightsthe capitalgain on the frequencyand/orthe physical
well-equipped satellites, the costs of moving, building, and launching satellites must be
substantial.
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space resource from technological development goes to the incumbent.
Thus, he will be able to pay back his initial development costs and investment. However, when the user right is defined over a shorter time
period than the expected life span of the equipment, the bid-up leasing
costs for the resources after unanticipatedtechnological developments
goes to the owner, that is, to the nationalor internationalauthoritythat
sells user rights.The holdermust simply scrapthe equipmentwhen he has
to pay so much for the lease that his variablecosts are not covered. He
receives no compensationthat can contributeto the coveringof the initial
investment. Investment risk is higher. Therefore, risk-averse investors
will invest less in the development of factor-specific techniques the
shorter the time period over which user rights are defined.
One could arguethat the price of time-limiteduser rightswill reflect the
risk involved in investmentin factor-specificequipmentso that there will
be no effect on investment incentives. That would be the case if all
equipment were of this type and all investors were equally risk-averse.
However, it is likely that some kinds of equipmentwill be factor-specific
while others are not. The shorterthe durationof the user right,the greater
the efforts that would be directed towards developing nonfactor-specific
equipment. Indefiniteuser rights would be neutralin this respect, however, and would not impose any extra costs of developingcertainkinds of
equipment. Similarly, indefinite user rights would be neutral between
more or less risk-averseinvestors.
D.

Well-Defined Liability Rules

The previous sections assumedthat use of the spectrumis precise with
respect to frequency and area affected, and that location of satellites in
space is exact. These assumptions,however, are seldom valid. Users of
the spectruminterferewith each other and space objects can collide. Thus
social and private costs in the uses of the two resources can diverge.
A common regulatory response to such external effects is either to
forbidthe interferenceof one activity with others or to put specifictechnical limits on the externaleffects. The latteris particularlycommonin the
use of common property resources. Well-knownexamples are quantitative regulations for air pollution by cars and factories or limits to the
amount of waste products dischargedin waters. Economists have often
argued against specific technological constraints and instead have suggested the taxationof pollutingactivities.16 The advantageof this method
is that those polluterswhose costs of decreasingtheirpollutionare lowest
will do so first. The desiredlevel of pollutionis thus obtainedat least cost.
16

A. C. Pigou, The Economics of Welfare 183 (1932).
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Coase has argued that the so-called Pigovian approach is often
inefficient.'7It may cost less for the activity harmedby pollutionto reallocate or to protect itself than for the polluterto reallocate or decrease its
emissions. Furthermore, Coase argued, an efficient allocation of resources could come about via market-inducednegotiationswithout any
interventionfrom regulatoryagencies. Whichsystem of reducingexternal
effects is more efficient depends on information,transactions, negotiations, and enforcementcosts-that is, on systems costs.
The electromagneticspectrumand the physical space resourcepresent
similarproblems of external effects in production.Use of the spectrum
may involve interference,but the optimaldegree of interferencemay not
be zero. Nor is interferencenecessarily reduced most cheaply by requiring the source of the interferenceto adjustits activity level. Similarly,use
of physical space involves a risk of collision, but the optimalprobabilityof
collision is not necessarily zero.'8
We contend that most externaleffects in the uses of space resource can
be reduced to efficient levels by market-inducednegotiationsonce liability rules are definedand enforced. This is superiorto a system of Pigovian
taxes because most interferences in the uses of space resources occur
between very few parties at adjoining frequencies or orbit slots. The
external effects are then relatively "individualized"so that the costs of
findingnegotiatingpartiesbecome relativelylow for space resources. The
Pigoviansolution is superioron the other hand when externaleffects are
"generalized," and many parties are affected by a particularactivity so
that the costs of startingand conductingnegotiationsare relatively high.
But a tax can be inefficient, for instance, if it forces a polluterto adjust
even when those activities hurt by pollution could adjust at lower costs;
additionally,a tax cannotbe fine-tunedto every differentkindof pollution
or interferencein differentareas.
By way of illustration,consider a firmthat has obtainedthe user rights
for a frequencyand an orbit slot. The firmplans to launch a satellite and
must decide on a number of variables, such as exact specifications on
antennae, ability to direct the signal, ability to remit with little interference on adjoiningfrequencies, the size of the area within which the satellite wanders, and the strengthof signals. We have previously considered
some trade-offsbetween these variables;here we consider the additional
trade-offsbetween equipmentcosts and the costs of interferingin different respects with other users of the spectrumand of space.
Coase, Social Cost, supra note 1.
physical use of space may also involve shadowing. Large space objects can temporarily shadow others and therefore cut off their energy supply. The economic problem in
this case is perfectly analogous to the ones discussed in the text.
17

18 The
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thatanoptimaldegreeof interference
It followsfromCoase'sargument
andcollisionriskcan be broughtabout,whetheror not a liabilityruleis
defined,if no costs areinvolvedin identifyingpotentialsourcesof interference for uses of adjoiningresources,in settingup negotiations,in
The definition
conductingnegotiations,andin enforcingan agreement.19
of a liabilityrulewilldeterminewho bearsthe costs of adjustingto interferences;it will not affectthe level of interference.20
wouldbe reachedevenwhencurrent
Theoptimaldegreeof interference
holdersand new entrantsinterferewith one another.All partieswould
in equipmentuntilthe costs of
gainby negotiatingmutualimprovements
exceedthe gains.
improvements
The assumptionsunderwhichthis marketsolutionwouldbe reached
are very restrictive,however.For instance,the users of adjoiningfrequenciesandlocationsare assumedto knowthe degreeof interference
is lacking,a
thatwillbe causedby thenewentrant.Whenthisinformation
could
benefitby installinglowliabilityruleis necessaryor newcomers
quality,interferingequipmentthatis very expensiveto modifyonce it is
in use. Measuresto decreaseinterference
arelikelyto be muchcheaperif
users
before
the
are
spaceobjectsareinstalled.Current
they implemented
of adjoiningfrequenciesandlocationsmustpaya higherprice,therefore,
to reduceinterferenceto an optimallevel (as definedin the case with
If insteadthe new entrantwereliablefor damages
perfectinformation).
causedby his satellite,he wouldbe inducedto startnegotiations
whenthe
costs of modifyingthe equipmentare at a minimum.
The situationis more complicatedwhen the numberof partieswith
is "generalized"
economicinterestsincreases,thatis, wheninterference
andwhenstartingnegotiations,negotiating,andenforcingagreementsall
becomemorecostly.A new entrantmaybe unableto obtaininformation
on every partywithwhichhe maypotentiallyinterfere.Suchsituations
could occurfor airplane-to-ground
from
communications,
broadcasting
satelliteoverwideareasto householdreceivers,navigationsatellites,and
so on. It wouldthenbe cheaperfor an authorityto specifythe qualityof
19 "In order to
carry out a markettransactionit is necessary to discover who it is one
wishes to deal with, to informpeople that one wishes to deal andon what terms, to conduct
negotiationsleadingup to a bargain,to draw up the contract,to undertakethe inspection
needed to make sure that the termsof the contractare being observed, and so on." Coase,
Social Cost, supra note 1, at 15.
20
We do not discuss how a liability rule should be defined but assume that it can be
definedin such a way that the marginalcost curve of the damagedpartyis restoredas if no
externaleconomies existed. There are great problemsin definingsuch a liabilityrule, however. See, for example, MichelleWhite, Long-Runversus Short-RunRemediesfor Spatial
Externalities:LiabilityRules, PollutionTaxes, andZoning(1979)(unpublishedpaperat New
York University).
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equipment or to assign a tax per unit of interference. The administrative
costs of such solutions must be weighed against the potential gains.
Liability rules are clearly not sufficient for social efficiency in all uses of
space resources. However, the "generalized" cases of interference may
be the exceptions rather than the rule. Cases of widespread interference
can be investigated to determine whether they in fact are efficient or
whether a tax could be applied at lower systems costs than a market
solution with liability rules.
An additional advantage of initially creating an institutional framework
for the market solution, rather than relying on a bureaucratic system, is
that the burden of proving inefficiencies then lies with those who advocate
direct regulatory allocation measures. We know that the market tends
towards efficiency, and we know the conditions under which bureaucratic
procedures can alleviate remaining inefficiencies. These conditions can be
investigated for specific cases. The opposite strategy, the creation of a
centralized agency for the allocation of space resources, does not inherently tend towards efficiency. A decision to start with a regulatory solution would put the burden of proving inefficiencies in the system on those
advocating a market solution. As no one case of inefficiency can be remedied by a market process without all potential users being subject to
the market test, it would, in fact, be impossible for any particular user to
show that the market solution would be better. Thus, a market process
would be more flexible in that it could be supplemented by regulatory
measures when needed, while flexibility in the opposite direction does not
accompany the bureaucratic system.
The advantages of allocating user rights by markets rather than by the
current regulatory system are particularly striking when we consider the
many dimensions of the orbit-frequency resource and the possible tradeoffs between them. The amount of information needed to allocate the
spectrum and orbit positions efficiently is enormous. This information is
widely dispersed among many producers and consumers and is not available to a regulatory agency. The market mechanism has the unique ability
to allocate resources despite the wide dispersion of information.21
This is the implicit conclusion of a U.S. position paper for the 1979
World Administrative Radio Conference. After stating that "a quantitative approach to the problem of choosing criteria for measuring efficiency
is desirable" the report recognizes the complexity of the problem and
concludes that
21
See, for example, F. A. Hayek, The Pretenceof Knowledge,77 SwedishJ. Econ. 433
(1975), for elaborationon this point in a general framework.See also Adam Smith, The
Wealthof Nations (1776).

This content downloaded from 206.211.139.204 on Thu, 8 Jan 2015 19:15:08 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

OUTER SPACE RESOURCES

37

when determiningorbit-spectrumefficiency, recognitionmust be given to user's
requirements,that is, efficiency must be treatedas a relativeparametervis-h-vis
the various communicationservices, with efforts made to optimize efficiency
within a given service.22
The impossibility of a quantitative approach in choosing efficiency criteria
should not surprise the economist. Efficient use of a resource is an economic concept that lends itself poorly to technological measurements.
This section concludes that efficiency requires the definition of (a)
complete markets for indefinite and divisible user rights to the two space
resources, (b) liability rules for interference when users of space resources lack information about the technology of potential users, and the
use of (c) taxation or possibly direct regulation of activities for which the
identification of damages and the enforcement of liability rules are relatively costly.
III.

REGIME:
CHOICEOF MANAGEMENT

EFFICIENCY

AND EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS

Is there any need for an international orbit and frequency authority,
and, if so, what roles should such an authority have? This section concludes that an authority can contribute little to achieving efficiency once
the institutional framework for complete markets exist. However, wellfunctioning international markets may require international trade and
legal conventions. The main task of an international space resource
authority is instead to achieve equity in the distribution of rents among
nations. We suggest, therefore, creating an international condominium to
auction the electromagnetic spectrum and the orbits and to distribute the
resulting revenues.
The current regime has been called a squatters'-rights regime because
ownership is distributed on a first-come, first-served basis. This is a misnomer in one important respect. Once a squatter's claim is secured, his
property rights are complete and he can sell his farm to more efficient,
more eager farmers or subdivide it for development. This was the case on
the American frontier during the 1800s.23 While it is true that a user of
22 U.S.
Dep't of State, Considerationsin the Matterof Measuresof GeostationaryOrbitSpectrumEfficiencyfor the Mobile Satellite Service 1 (CCIRStudy Groups, Special PreparatoryMeeting,WARC-79)(Doc. P/226-E20, June 1978).
23 In the settlement of
plentiful land in the United States, pioneers had the right to
cultivate uncultivatedland and to claim ownershipof the developed land after a specific
intervalhadpassed withoutanyoneelse substantiatingclaimsto the same piece of land. The
squatter'sownershiprights,once established,were not limited.He couldresellor subdivide
the land.
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orbit slots or the frequency spectrum is a squatter in the sense of claiming
resources not used by anyone else, his claim and use of these resources do
not grant him the right to sell all or part of them. His property rights are
therefore circumscribed in an important respect which distinguishes the
current regime from a true squatter's regime. Currently there are restrictions on the intranational transfer of user rights as well on their international trading. For example, the Federal Communications Commission
must approve users of the electromagnetic spectrum in the United States.
A true squatters'-rights regime may be less efficient than auctioning
user rights even when the conditions for efficient markets are fulfilled.
One reason is that transfer costs between different orbits and frequencies
may prevent a latecomer in space from obtaining an optimal position
or frequency, since the resources cannot be claimed without physical
presence. The complementary nature of orbit slots and frequencies emphasizes this inefficiency of the squatters'-rights regime because a potential user of space resources cannot claim parts of the two resources simultaneously. An auctioning system could be designed in such a way that
this complementarity could be recognized, however. A second inefficiency inherent in squatters' rights, at least at an initial stage, could arise
when the income-constrained prices that firms are willing to pay for the
resources are lower than the prices that the same firms demand to give up
the resources.24 An auction of space resources at a very early stage in the
exploitation of space could decrease this problem initially. However, the
major difference between a squatters'-rights regime and a resource auction is related to the problem of equity rather than efficiency. We shall
return to this issue below.
Our conditions for efficiency above include freedom of international as
well as intranational trade. Inefficiencies arise if governments restrict
bidding for their share of the resources to domestic firms. Only by chance
would domestic and foreign prices be equal in a no-trade situation. Tariffs
or quotas on trade in space resources therefore entail global welfare
losses, and a convention on international free trade in user rights is necessary for efficiency. Thus, there is an important role for international conventions similar to those of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). The optimal tariff argument suggests that one country could gain
by restricting trade in its shares of the space resources if these were
imperfect substitutes for the shares of other countries and possessed a
comparative advantage in producing specific services demanded by other
nations. Therefore, in an initial distribution of property rights no single
24 See A. C. Fisher & J. V. Krutilla, Managing the Public Lands: Assignment of Property
Rights and Valuation of Resources, in The Governance of Common Property Resources
(Edwin T. Haeffele ed. 1974).

This content downloaded from 206.211.139.204 on Thu, 8 Jan 2015 19:15:08 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

OUTER SPACE RESOURCES

39

country or small group of countries should be given a monopoly on
specific space resources that it can exploit by imposingan optimaltariff.
Some nationsmay also wish to allocate all or partsof their resources in
a bureaucraticmanner. For example, nations may reserve parts of the
spectrumfor militarypurposes or for other services that are supplied by
government authorities. The frequency spectrum can provide public
goods, such as emergency communicationsand militaryservices, which
are nonmarketable,but this should not free the respective government
authorityfrom the markettest of the willingness to pay for the use of a
scarce resource.
Once parts of the resource are allocated by nonmarketmethods, it is
impossible to say whether the marketmechanismwould lead to the optimal allocation of remainingparts. We face a second-best problem. However, we cannot arguethat any other mechanismwould functionbetter in
general. What we can say is that the marketmechanismwould lead to an
efficient allocation of the remainingmarketablespace resources if there
were little substitutabilitybetween those resources allocated bureaucratically and those allocated througha market. This is likely to be the
case for many uses of space resources in providingservices on a national
level. It may not be the case, however, for services provided both by
frequency use in space and along the ground. The gratis resource would
be overutilizedrelative to the marketedpart of the spectrum.
Inevitableinterferencesin the use of spectrumand orbit resources suggest the need for an internationallegal convention, because liabilityrules
must be definedand enforced. Such a conventionwould not be necessary
if enough national laws were directly applicableto the use of space resources. Lackingthese, internationalinterferencerequiresan international
legal frameworkthat is accepted and enforcedby all nations. Specification
of such a legal frameworkwould not be unique. Parallelsexist in international law, such as the liability rules regulatingcollision at sea. Liability
rules could either be accepted internationallyand enforced by courts in
individualnations, or the internationalauthoritycould serve as a courtfor
cases involving damages in the use of the frequency spectrum and the
physical space resource.
The need for taxationor directregulationof the use of the spectrumand
the orbitresourcesby an internationalauthorityarises only when so many
activities are affected by some particularactivity that liability rules are
not sufficientto reduce interferenceto an optimallevel. It then becomes
too costly to negotiate with all parties involved and to enforce liability
rules throughcourt procedures. Frequencies for emergency signalingat
sea, maritimecommunicationand navigationsatellites, and air-transport
communicationsare examples of such activities. A worldwideassignment
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of certain frequencies to these activities and specification of signal
strengthand other characteristicsmay be the system that offers the lowest
social costs.
The major task of an internationalauthority for managingspace resources will be to distributerents. When a nonreproducibleresource becomes scarce, it generatesrents. Discussion of the normativequestionsof
who should enjoy these rents and how the desired distributioncan be
achieved has often been confused since space has traditionallybeen considered an internationalcommon property resource to which access is
open and free. Propertyrights to the resource consequentlyhave usually
not been precisely defined and their rents have seldom appeared
explicitly.25The importance of rents is nevertheless illustratedby the
struggleover propertyrights at the WorldAdministrativeRadio Conference (WARC-79)proceedings.
Allocating user rights througha regime of squatters' rights would resemble the acquisitionof titles to gold and land duringthe westwardpush
of the Americanfrontier. Space would be a new frontier and firms and
nationswould rush to claim the most valuableorbit slots and frequencies.
The best-equipped firms in the most technologically advanced nations
could quickly claim valuable space property,and little of the rents would
remain for other nations. Such a regime is unacceptableto most countries.26
The currentregime regulatingaccess to the electromagneticspectrum
and orbits is similarto that traditionallyused for commons. Governments
apply for user rights to the InternationalTelecommunicationsUnion
which grants such rights on a first-come, first-servedbasis for an unlimited time period. The applicantis in effect grantedrents for the period of
use.27 If entry were not regulatedby this nonmarketmethod, rents would
be dissipated throughcongestion and interference.28
Some developing countries have proposed either that user rights be
reserved for futureuse by countriesthat have no currentuse for them or
that the electromagneticspectrum and the satellite orbit be subdivided
25 The common statement that common property resources belong to everyone and
thereforeto no one reflectsthis lack of precision.It containsa non sequiturwhich may be
responsiblefor some of the confusion.
26 The
equatorialcountrieshave claimed sovereigntyover the part of the geostationary
orbitwhich is immediatelyabove theirterritory.These claimshave not been recognizedby
others.
27 In
general,the rentsmay appearin any monopolizedstageof the productionprocessfor
final services. For example, if an equatorialcountry holds a monopoly on advantageous
launchingsites, it can extract space rents by imposinglaunchingfees.
28
Dissipationof rents is a well-knownphenomenonin the fishingindustrywith unregulated and gratisentry.
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andtitle to its partsdistributed
amongcountriesin an equitablemanner.
Thesetwo proceduresareequivalentin termsof equitywhenuserrights
are accordedin perpetuity.However,unlessmarketsfor resaleor subleasingof spaceresourcesarealso allowed,greaterequityis achievedat
the expenseof less efficiencysince scarceresourceswill be hoardedfor
futureuse.
The auctionmethodfor allocatinguser rightsas a way to ensureefficiency in resourceuse is consistentwith any distributionof rents. The

equity aspect of managingorbits and frequenciescould thereforebe separated from efficiency aspects. This separationwould be complete with
perfect capital marketsand speculative investors linkingcurrentand expected future prices. An InternationalSpace Condominiumcould be set
up to managethe electromagneticspectrumand satellite orbits. The condominiumcould lease or sell the rights to use these resources for limited
or unlimitedperiods of time to the highest bidder. If biddingis competitive, auctioninguser rights would maximize the rents due to the scarce
resource. Revenues, net of operatingexpenses, could be distributedto the
shareholders,which initially might be nationalgovernments.The distribution of rents would then be determined by how shares in the condominiumare distributedamong governments.29
This regime for internationalcommunalownership has several advantages over the currentsystem:
1. The resources are put to most efficient use and rents are maximized
when rights to use them are auctionedto the most efficientusers. The
auctioningsystem is, furthermore,an impartialmethod of allocation.
2. The distributionof rents can be designedto conformto what the international community considers an equitable distribution;this can be
done throughinternationalnegotiationsto determinethe initial distribution of shares in the condominium.
3. The allocationof user rightsis separatedfrom the distributionof rents
and the questionof efficiencyis therebyseparatedfromthe questionof
equity. Only the distributiveaspects are subject to political negotiations.

The advantages of the proposed condominiumover the existing proposal to carve up and nationalizethe electromagneticspectrumand orbit
slots are not as clear. Carvingup resources amongnationsmay, in principle, be as efficientas an auctionsystem if it is combinedwith international
29
We do not treatthe interestingquestionwhethergovernmentsshouldbe allowedto sell
theirsharesto othergovernmentsor to privateentities. Shouldthe sharesresembleSDRsor
freely transferableassets?
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free trade and with appropriatelegal conventions. Also the resources, in
principle,could be carvedup and distributedin such proportionsthat they
would provide the desired distributionof rents. In respect to efficiency
and equity, the two proposals are equivalent. However, certainpractical
and additionalconsiderationsmake our proposal superiorto nationalization.
First, the strengthof nationalvested interests suggests that the initial
distributionof titles to space resources will more or less reflect the existing distributionof user rights. It may be politicallydifficultto awardtitle
to frequencybands to countriesother than those that currentlyhave user
rights to them. It may also be costly if the new distributionof ownership
rightscauses a redistributionof user rights because of a reluctanceon the
part of countriesto trade in user rights. A more substantialredistribution
of wealth in favor of the poorer countries may therefore be achieved if
existing user rights were left intact and thereafteracquired-or lost-in
the marketplace.The resultingrentalincome would insteadbe distributed
at the political negotiatingtable.
Second, while it is possible to subdividespace resources and distribute
titles to the parts, it is impossible to achieve a desired distributionwith a
reasonabledegree of accuracy. Frequencybandsand orbitalpositions are
heterogeneousfactors of production.Withoutmarketswhere they can be
traded,theirvalue cannot be accuratelyestablished.In short, the value of
the resources being distributedis unknown. Lacking this information,a
lottery of frequency bands and orbital positions could probablyachieve
the desired distributionof wealth as well as a planneddistribution.Large
rich countrieswith diversifiedeconomies and a preferencefor risk should
find a space-asset lottery less objectionablethan would small developing
countries. Yet the latter have advanced the proposal for carving up the
common property. While they may prefer this to the existing regime, we
believe it is inferiorto the proposedcondominiumregime. Owninga share
in a portfolio of diverse space assets is less risky than owning a single
space asset.
Finally, search and administrativecosts in the marketsfor orbits and
frequenciescould be minimizedwhen transactionsare madevia the internationalcondominium,which would serve as an exchange.
IV.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

We have suggesteda regimefor managingthe two space resources, the
physical space resource and the electromagneticspectrum. To achieve
efficiencyan internationalconventionestablishingintra-and international
free trade in divisible, indefinite user rights to the complete resources
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shouldbe agreedupon.A legalconventionon the definitionandenforcementof liabilityrulesis alsocrucialforefficiency.Anauthorityto manage
space resourcesis neededonly for those activitiesthat interferewith a
largenumberof otheractivities.
To achieveequity,we have suggestedthe creationof an international
to auctionuserrightsto the tworesources.Therents
spacecondominium
in proportionto nations'
fromthe scarceresourceswouldbe distributed
sharesin it. The distributionof these shareswouldbe determinedby
politicalnegotiations.One advantageof this proposalover the current
regimeandotherproposalsis thatthepoliticalstruggleforrentswouldnot
interferewithefficiencyin the use of resources.Thecondominium
could
auctionlimiteduserrightsat recurrentintervalsor it couldbe dissolved
after it had distributedthe rents from its first-and last-auction of unlimited user rights. An internationalmanagementauthoritycould remain
to oversee internationalconventions and directly regulatedactivities. A
regime of unlimiteduser rights to the resources may be politically unacceptable because unanticipatedcapital gains accrue to individualholders
rather than to the internationalcommunity. Leasing of user rights for
specific time periods by the condominiummay result in a moreacceptable
distributionof these capitalgains-and losses-but involves some loss of
efficiency.
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